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This paper analyzes the dynamic effects of anticipated and unanticipated oil price increases in
a small two-country monetary union, which is simultaneously characterized by asymmetric
wage adjustments and asymmetric interest rate sensitivities of private absorption. It is shown
that both types of oil price disturbances lead to temporary divergences in output developments
across the monetary union. In the case of anticipated oil price increases the relative cyclical
position of output effects is reversed in the course of the adjustment process. With anticipated
oil price increases complete stabilization of the output variables throughout the overall ad-
justment process requires restrictive monetary policy to be time-inconsistent from a quantita-
tive but time-consistent from a qualitative point of view. That means that the central bank
credibly announces a future reduction in the growth rate of nominal money stock but actually
realizes a decrease in the monetary growth rate, which is less restrictive than the announce-
ment.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of oil price shocks in a small, partially asymmetric mone-
tary union and discusses the implications for monetary policy. The analysis is motivated by
the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and by the recent sub-
stantial increase in oil prices. The establishment of EMU introduced a common monetary
policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) and brought about some convergence in the
transmission patterns in the member countries. Nevertheless, important asymmetries in the
macroeconomic structures remain.
1 These macroeconomic asymmetries imply that symmetric
shocks such as a common oil price shock cause asymmetric developments in output and in-
flation within the monetary union.
Recently, there has been a considerable interest in asymmetric monetary transmission in
Europe. While most studies focus on asymmetries in the financial sphere there are also im-
portant asymmetries in goods and labor markets. Obviously, a fully asymmetric specification
of the monetary union soon reaches analytical limits. We therefore specify a partially asym-
metric union, which captures key macroeconomic asymmetries but remains nevertheless ana-
lytically tractable and allows to illustrate the adjustment dynamics graphically. Using this
partially asymmetric framework, we focus on the dynamic effects of anticipated and unantici-
pated oil price increases.
The structure of the model is as follows: the monetary union consists of two countries. It
is simultaneously characterized by structural asymmetries on the demand and the supply side.
The model can be interpreted as an IS/LM model augmented by a supply side with (1) a Phil-
lips curve based on rational expectations of prices and exchange rates and (2) imported oil in
domestic production and (3) a long-run supply function. We examine the short-run, medium-
run and long-run effects of anticipated and unanticipated oil price increases on both member
countries. This setup then serves as a background for the analysis of monetary policy. We
assume that the primary goal of monetary policy is price stability and investigate to which
extent the ECB may also be able to dampen the differential cyclical developments within the
monetary union caused by the common external price shock.
The implications of this paper go well beyond the role of imported raw materials in an
open economy. In fact, it can also be applied to all intermediate goods produced abroad and
used for domestic production. We therefore use in this paper the terms oil imports, raw mate-
                                                
1 See,  e.g.,  Cecchetti (1999) or the survey in Clausen (2001). The macroeonomic implications of demand
asymmetries taking the form of different interest sensitivities of aggregate demand are discussed in detail in
Clausen and Wohltmann (2003).3
rial imports or imports of intermediate goods interchangably. In view of the globalization of
supply chains the importance of intermediate imports has generally increased.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 analyzes the
dynamic effects of anticipated and unanticipated oil price increases. Section 4 discusses the
appropriate response by monetary policy to these price shocks. Section 5 summarizes our
main results. The paper includes a mathematical appendix, which contains a detailed deriva-
tion of the analytical solution to our dynamic macroeconomic model.
2.  A model of a monetary union
We consider a monetary union, which consists of two member countries U1 and U2. The
member countries are identical in size and the monetary union as a whole is considered small
relative to the rest of the world. Both member countries use imported oil for domestic pro-
duction:
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The notation is as follows:
2  q= real output,  y = real income, i = nominal interest rate,
c p i & − = real interest rate, g = real government expenditure, p = producer price level of the
domestically produced good, τ = final goods terms of trade, e = nominal exchange rate of the
union with respect to the rest of the world expressed in units of domestic currency for one unit
of foreign currency, m = nominal money stock in the union
3, w = nominal wage, π = trend or
core rate of inflation, p
c = consumer price index, q = steady state level of q (natural level of
output), 
∗
R p = price of oil or of other intermediate good,  p e pR − +
∗ = real oil price,
) ( e p p R + −
∗ = intermediate goods terms of trade.
The IS equations (1) and (2) describe aggregate demand in the two member countries of
the monetary union. Goods market equilibrium in country Uj (j = 1, 2) requires domestic pro-
duction (qj) to equal the sum of real private absorption (first expression in brackets), real gov-
ernment expenditure (gj) and the difference between the real ex- and import of final goods
(second expression in brackets). Real private absorption is assumed to depend negatively on
the real interest rate and international trade in final goods (trade balance excluding imports of
raw materials) negatively with respect to the terms of trade. Equations (3) and (4) define the
terms of trade with respect to final goods. The IS equations are assumed symmetric except for
different semi-interest elasticities of private absorption. We assume private absorption in U1
to respond more strongly to interest rates compared to U2 ( 22 21 a a > ).
The LM equation (5) reflects money market equilibrium in the monetary union. Money
demand in country Uj is assumed to depend on domestic production qj, which is considered a
more appropriate measure of the volume of transactions than real income yj. The nominal
money stock m is deflated by the consumer price indices (13) and (14) to allow for the fact
that in open economies money is also used for the purchase of imported goods. Perfect capital
mobility within the monetary union as well as between the monetary union and the rest of the
world implies uncovered interest parity (6). Interest rates within the union are equalized and
                                                
2  All variables – except for the interest rates  i1, i2 and i
∗ - are logarithmized. The variables of member country
U1 (U2) are labeled with the lower case index „1“ („2“). Variables with a „∗“ describe foreign variables. A
dot above a variable indicates the right-hand side derivative with respect to time; a bar indicates a steady state
or long-run equilibrium value of the respective variable. All structural parameters in the equations (1)-(16)
are taken to be positive. They can be interpreted as elasticities or semi-elasticities.
3 The monetary aggregate m is derived from the underlying LM equation through log-linearization. Denoting
the underlying levels of the aggregate money stock with M and of money demand with ) 2 , 1 ( = j L P j
c
j , money
market equilibrium implies  2 2 1 1 L P L P M
c c + = . Provided that the initial values of money demand are identical
in both member countries and using the approximation  0 0 ln ln / M M M dM − ≈ it is possible to derive m =
2(lnM-ln 2).5
may deviate only by the rationally anticipated rate of depreciation e & from the foreign interest
rate i
∗.
The equations (7) and (8) link domestic production qj with real income or gross national
product yj. The difference originates from real intermediate imports. Real imports of raw ma-
terials (intermediate goods) can be expressed in non-logarithmized form as the product of the
real price of raw materials ( j R P E P / ⋅
∗ ) and the physical import Rj.
4 Assuming for simplicity a
proportional relationship between the quantity Rj and the (non-logarithmized) level of domes-
tic production Qj of the form  0)   æ 1 (   æ > > ⋅ = j j Q R ,
5 we derive after a logarithmic-linear
approximation the equations (7) and (8) where  ( )   æ 1 /   æ − = ψ  provided that the initial value
of the intermediate goods terms of trade  ) /( E P P R j ⋅
∗   is normalized to unity [Wohltmann
1993]. 
6
The equations (9) and (10) describe price adjustment within the monetary union. The rates
of inflation in Uj are determined by a weighted average of domestic nominal wage inflation
and of the rate of change of the real price of raw materials expressed in domestic currency.
The corresponding weights µ (1-µ) reflect the average shares of wage costs (raw material
costs) in the overall variable costs of a representative firm.
7 The equations (9) and (10) are
dynamic versions of mark up-price setting [Buiter 1979].
The equations (11) and (12) describe the dynamics of wage adjustment in the monetary
union. The rate of change of wages in Uj is determined by an expectations-augmented Phil-
lips-curve where inflationary expectations are given by the trend or core rate of inflation (πj).
8
We assume that wage setters in both member countries base their decisions on different time
horizons. In U1, the trade unions take a long-run perspective. Their rate of nominal wage in-
creases is linked to the rate of growth of the money stock in the monetary union, which in turn
determines the long-run rate of inflation. In U2, wage setting is based on the rationally antici-
pated short-run development of consumer price inflation based on (14). Furthermore, both
wage setting equations contain a component reflecting wage pressure, which is modeled ac-
cording to Okun’s law using the output gap, i.e., the difference between actual and potential
                                                
4  In this paper, capital letters generally indicate non-logarithmized variables.
5  See for more details also Findlay and Rodriguez (1977) and Buiter (1978).
6  In production functions, which allow for factor substitution, the constant ψ depends on the elasticity of sub-
stitution between factors of production and from the share of imported inputs in aggregate production. See
Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984).
7 The  expression  1-µ can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of openness of the economy on the supply
side (Bhandari and Turnovsky 1984). In contrast, the parameter α3 in the price adjustment equations (13) and
(14) reflect the openness of the economy with respect to the large foreign country on the demand side.
8  See for more details also Buiter and Miller (1982) and van der Ploeg (1990).6
output.
9   Without this wage pressure component ( 0 = δ ), the trade unions show insider-
outsider-behavior and the wage equation in U1 corresponds with nominal wage rigidity while
wage setting in U2 can be interpreted as real wage rigidity based on the consumer price in-
dex.
10 Nominal wages are therefore more flexible in U2 than in U1. In U1, nominal wages only
respond to the output gap as long as the rate of monetary growth remains unchanged. In U2,
nominal wage changes  2 w &  react via  2 π  to anticipated changes in the consumer price index.
Consumer price inflation includes the anticipated rate of depreciation e &, which, in turn, im-
mediately responds to exogenous shocks. In consequence, the rate of change of nominal
wages in U2 responds directly to the anticipated rate of depreciation e & . In U1, the rate of
change is determined by the constant rate of growth of money stock. In contrast, producer
price inflation  1 p &  and  2 p &  responds in both member countries directly to e & . This can be di-
rectly seen from the price adjustment equations (9) and (10).
Equations (15) and (16) describe long-run supply functions within the monetary union. In
the long-run assuming labor market equilibrium, a neoclassical production function and a per-
fectly elastic supply of raw materials, goods supply depends positively on the final and inter-
mediate goods terms of trade and on the internal price differential (internal terms of trade).
11
In summary, our monetary union is assumed completely symmetric except for exactly one
asymmetry in both, the demand and the supply side. On the demand side, U1 is characterized
by a relatively higher interest sensitivity of private absorption. On the supply side, U2 is char-
acterized by a relatively higher degree of nominal wage flexibility. We show in the following
that as a result of these asymmetries oil price shocks generate adjustment dynamics in both
member countries, which display considerable quantitative as well as qualitative differences
within the monetary union.
Using the solution method of Aoki (1981), the model is decomposed into an aggregate and
a difference system. The aggregate system is derived by adding corresponding equations of
U1 and U2. It describes the behavior of the monetary union as a whole. The difference system
is derived by the subtraction of corresponding equations of U1 and U2. It describes the differ-
ential developments within the monetary union. The method by Aoki, which was predomi-
                                                
9 See  Claassen (1980).
10 The  OECD (2000) finds that the EMU member countries differ considerably in their degrees of wage flexi-
bility. For example, the degree of nominal wage flexibility in France is relatively small while being relatively
large in Germany (see table 11, p. 108). In contrast, the impact of the rate of unemployment on real wages
has a similar magnitude in both countries. As long as the monetary union is assumed to consist of France (U1)
and Germany (U2) the parameter δ can be assumed to be identical in (11) and (12).
11  A more detailed theoretical derivation of the role of the terms of trade in aggregate supply is given in Wohlt-
mann and Bulthaupt (1999) and Devereux and Purvis (1980). The supply equations (15) and (16) can also be
derived by assuming static price and wage equations with full wage indexation in the long-run.7
nantly applied to symmetric models, can only be used in our asymmetric model when we as-
sume identical weights α1 and α2 in the consumer price definitions (13) and (14), i.e., that
consumers in the monetary union are indifferent between domestically produced goods and
imports from the respective partner country. The simplifying assumption α1=α2  may be justi-
fied for highly integrated monetary unions and allows us to solve the aggregate system inde-
pendently from the difference system. With α1=α2, the price indices 
c p1  and 
c p2  are identical.
In conjunction with the uncovered interest parity (6) it follows that real interest rates are
equalized within the monetary union (
c c p i p i 2 2 1 1 & & − = − ). In contrast, the producer price levels
p1 and p2 and the corresponding rates of producer price inflation  1 p &  and  2 p &  differ across the
monetary union. The arithmetic mean of the solutions to the aggregate and the difference
system yields the solution paths for the output and price developments in the individual mem-
ber countries. The detailed analytical derivations are provided in the mathematical appendix.
3.  Effects of an Oil Price Increase
This section analyzes the dynamic effects of anticipated and unanticipated increases in the
price of imported oil ( 0 d >
∗
R p ) on both member countries. In the case of an anticipated in-
crease in 
∗
R p , we assume that the price increase is credibly announced in t = 0 and happens at
the later date T > 0. An unanticipated price shock comes as a surprise to the private sector and
happens already at t = 0. Both types of shocks have identical effects in the steady state but
differ in their adjustment dynamics.
Effects on the Aggregate Monetary Union
The long-run or steady state effects of an oil price increase result from the equilibrium
condition  2 1 ) ( 0 p p p m & & & & & − = − = = τ  for the dynamics of the aggregate and the difference
system.
12 In long-run equilibrium, member country outputs q1 and q2 equal their long-run lev-
els  1 q  and  2 q  according to the long-run supply functions (15) and (16). An oil price increase
leads in the monetary union to a decline in aggregate union output  2 1 q q q + = , which is
                                                
12  The long-run is considered as the imaginary period in which the dynamic adjustments of the aggregate and
the difference system are completed. In the case of the aggregate variable we have τ  and p:  2 1 τ τ τ + = ,
2 1 p p p + = .8
evenly distributed across the monetary union (d 1 q =d 2 q <0).
13 It follows that asymmetries in
wage setting or in the interest sensitivities of aggregate demand do not affect the ultimate im-
pact on member country outputs  1 q  and  2 q . One reason is that in our model producer price
inflation  p & = 1 p & + 2 p & , the rate of depreciation e & and consumer price inflation 
c p & =
c p1 & +
c p2 &
are ultimately only determined by the rate of monetary growth in the union
(
c p e p m & & & & = = = 2 ). The second reason is that oil price shocks of the form  0 d >
∗
R p  leave
nominal and real interest rates as well as the internal price differential p1-p2 ultimately unaf-
fected. In contrast, the external terms of trade  2 1 τ τ τ + =  change in the long run. Provided
that
(17) ) 0 1 ( ) ( 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 5 > − + − = ⋅ > + − > b b a f b b a b λ λ ψ
holds, the oil price increase leads to a fall in the aggregate terms of trade ( 0 d / d
* < R p τ ).
14
The first inequality in (17) ensures that the long-run IS curve in  q / τ -diagram has a „normal“
negative slope
15, while the second inequality ensures that the long-run IS curve in Figure 1
moves in response to 0 d >
∗
R p further to the left than the upward-sloping long-run aggregate
supply curve (AS).
16
                                                
13  In contrast, an isolated increase in the price of imported final goods (dp
∗>0) leads to an increase of q . In this
case, 
* * d / d d / d R p q p q − =  holds.
14  An increase in p
∗ leads to  0 d / d d / d
* * > − = R p p τ τ  provided that (17) holds. The nominal exchange rate e
can only achieve a long-run equilibrium as long as the nominal money stock in the union remains constant
( 0 = m & ). In this case we find, given (17),  0 d / d
* > R p e  and, respectively,  0 d / d
* < p e , i.e., an increase in the
price of imported raw materials (final goods) leads to a real and a nominal depreciation (appreciation) of the
common currency. Due to  0 2 ) ( 2 c p p q y R − − + ⋅ + =
∗ ∗ ψ τ ψ  we also find in the case  0 d >
∗
R p  ( 0 d >
∗ p ) an
overproportionate fall (rsp. increase) in real income  2 1 y y y + = relative to real output q .
15  The assumption of a „normal“ reaction of the trade balance to changes in the final goods terms of trade τ  is
insufficient because an increase in τ  raises due to  0 2 ) ( 2 c p p q y R − − + ⋅ + =
∗ ∗ ψ τ ψ  private absorption
holding other factors constant.
16  Using a CES production function, the parameter f3 can be linked to the variable factors labor and imported
raw materials as follows  µ µ σ β / ) 1 )( ( 3 − + = f  [Wohltmann and Bulthaupt (1999)]; where β indicates the
real-wage elasticity of the labor supply and σ  the elasticity of substitution. The second inequality in (17)
holds provided that the sum of both elasticities is sufficiently small.9
The jump in oil prices  0 d >
∗
R p  normally leads to a permanent decline in the real money
stock ( 0 d / ) ( d
* < − R p p m ). Provided that the nominal money stock is constant ( 0 = m & ) this is
equivalent to a permanent increase in the aggregate producer price level p = p1 + p2.
17
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Figure 1: Long-Run Effects of an Oil Price Increase
The dynamics of adjustment of the aggregate monetary union to an oil price increase can
be illustrated in a phase diagram including the state variables τ  and m-p (Figure 2).
18 The
points Q0 and Q1 denote the initial and the final equilibrium of the aggregate system and S0
and S1 the corresponding convergent saddle paths. The dynamic adjustment of the state vector
(τ , m-p) in response to an anticipated oil price increase shows on impact a discontinuous
jump from Q0 to B (or B’). It is followed by a movement along a trajectory, which converges
asymptotically to the unstable branch I0 belonging to the saddle point Q0 (BC or B’C’). After
the implementation in T, the system moves along the unique convergent saddle path S1 to the
new long-run equilibrium Q1.
19
                                                
17 We  find 
* d / ) ( d R p p m− < 0 if and only if  ψ λ α ψ α ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 5 1 2 1 1 3 b b a l f f b l b b a + − + + < + − . This con-
dition holds if  0 1 1 3 < − l f α  or  5 b  is sufficiently large.
18  We use the real variables τ and  m-p as state variables in the phase diagram because steady state values of the
nominal exchange rate e and the aggregate price level p do not exist in the presence of a positive rate of
growth of the money stock. The terms of trade τ  are taken as a jump variable as it includes the forward-
looking variable e. As a result of price rigidity, the producer-oriented real money stock m-p is taken as pre-
determined. In contrast, the consumer-oriented real money stock m-p
c is a non-predetermined variable be-
cause the aggregate consumer price index 
c c c p p p 2 1 + =  includes the jump variable e.
19  It is assumed here that  0 d / d
* < R p τ  and 
* d / ) ( d R p p m− < 0, which prevail as long as the weak condition
(17) holds and provided that b5 is sufficiently large. Moreover, it is assumed that Q1 remains below the un-10
The anticipation of a future increase in oil prices leads on impact to a real depreciation
of the common currency. It equals the nominal depreciation due to the assumption of short-
run price rigidity. The size of the instantaneous fall in the terms of trade τ is inversely related
to the time span T between the announcement and the actual implementation of the price in-
crease. We find „undershooting“ of the final goods terms of trade in point B in the case of a
long time span T and „overshooting“ in B’ given a short span. In the extreme case of an unan-
ticipated increase in 
∗
R p  (T=0), the impact effect is given in B
∗ on the saddle path S1 where the
size of the impact depreciation reaches its maximum.
 


















1 τ B’ •
Figure 2: Effects of an Oil Price Increase on the Aggregate Monetary Union
After the immediate impact depreciation the real depreciation of the common currency
continues further in the case of an anticipated price increase. This adjustment pattern differs
from the case of an unanticipated price increase.  Furthermore, in the adjustment process fol-
lowing the impact effect the real money stock m-p subsequently falls because the real depre-
ciation ( 0 < τ & ) and the implicit nominal depreciation e & cause nominal wage increases in U2,
which in turn raise the aggregate rate of producer inflation beyond the level determined by the
initial rate of monetary growth ( 0 m p & & > ). The parallel development of the terms of trade τ
and of the real money stock m-p ends at the date of implementation T. In the case of a “large”
T, i.e., that the time span between the anticipation and the implementation is relatively long,
we find for t>T a continuation of the real depreciation, which leads in conjunction with the
                                                                                                                                                        
stable branch I0. The theoretical possibility that Q1 is located above I0, which arises for example with ex-11
discontinuous fall in the rate of inflation in T  to an increase in the real money stock (adjust-
ment path CQ1). For “small” values of T (and, in particular, in the special case T = 0) we find
after the implementation in T a real appreciation, which coincides with a further reduction in
the real money stock (adjustment path C’Q1). The adjustment dynamics ultimately arrive at
the new final equilibrium Q1 on the saddle path S1  irrespective whether T  is “small” or
“large”.
The aggregate real interest rate and the rate of real appreciation τ &  behave inversely due
to
(18) τ α & & & & ) 1 ( 2 ) ( ) ( 3 2 2 1 1 − − = − = − + −
∗ i p i p i p i
c c c (
c c c p p p i i i 2 1 2 1 , & & & + = + = )
and because the foreign interest rate i
∗ is considered exogenous. A real depreciation of the
common currency (τ & < 0) implies that real interest rates in Europe 
c p i & − are above their
steady state level and vice versa. In Figure 2, the rate of real appreciation τ &  is negative
throughout the period up to T such that the aggregate real interest rate 
c p i & − exceeds its
steady state level (2i
∗).
20 The increase in 
c p i & − is accomplished despite the initial increase in
the rate of inflation 
c p & by an even stronger increase in the short-term nominal interest rate i.
21
At the date of implementation T, the rate of appreciation τ &  increases discontinuously, which
implies a simultaneous fall in the aggregate real interest rate. For „small“ T, the aggregate real
interest rate remains for t > T below its long run level 2i
∗, while remaining above this level for
„large“ T. In the long-run, the real interest rate returns to its initial steady state level (2i
∗).
The effect on aggregate demand and output  2 1 q q q + =  in the period  T t < < 0  is char-
acterized by two opposing influences. The real depreciation of the common currency increas-
ingly improves the unions trade balance and increases due to (17) aggregate demand. On the
other hand, the increase in the aggregate real interest rate reduces real private absorption. Pro-
vided that the weak condition
(19) 3 2 3 2 1 1 5 2 3 ) 1 ( ) ) ( ( )) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (( α µ α ψ µ µ α a b b a b l − > + − − − + +
                                                                                                                                                        
tremely large values of  b5 or  ) (
2
1
22 21 2 a a a + = , is considered irrelevant on empirical grounds.
20  After the impact effect, real interest rates increase continuously up to T.
21 The  rise  in  i follows from the uncovered interest parity (6) and the increase in the rate of depreciation e &.12
holds, the impact effect of an anticipated oil price increase on aggregate output  2 1 q q q + =  is
on balance positive:  0 ) 0 ( q q > + .
22 Given (19), the anticipation of a future oil price increase
leads to an immediate expansion in aggregate output in the monetary union.
23
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Figure 3: Aggregate output effects in the monetary union
The subsequent development of aggregate output up to T is theoretically ambiguous. On
the one hand, the external trade balance successively improves following the discontinuous
depreciation on impact and subsequent further reductions in the terms of tradeτ .On the other
hand, the real interest rate increases and lowers the interest-sensitive part of private absorp-
tion. With realistic empirical parameterizations, the contractionary real interest rate effect
dominates the expansionary terms of trade effect such that aggregate output q falls after the
initial expansion. The fall in aggregate output typically continues even below the initial equi-
                                                
22  Inequality (19) holds if the terms of trade elasticity of the trade balance (b5) is large relative to the interest
sensitivity of private absorption (a2). In this case, the expansionary terms of trade effect dominates the con-
tractionary real interest rate effect. Condition (19) also holds if the semi-interest elasticity of money demand
(l2) is sufficiently large. In the special case without imported raw materials ( 0 , 1 = = ψ µ ) condition (19)
simplifies to  3 2 3 5 2 3 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( α α α a b l − > + . This condition ensures that an anticipated increase in the rate of
monetary growth m &  leads on impact to an increase of aggregate output [Wohltmann and Clausen (2001)].
Given a role for imported raw materials in domestic production, condition (19) ensures that an anticipated in-
crease in m &  again leads to expansionary impact effect on output.
23  This result critically depends on the “normal” reaction of the trade balance with respect to changes in the
terms of trade based on final goods, i.e., that the assumption  0 5 > b  already holds in the very short-run. This
assumption was already made in the overshooting model by Dornbusch (1976) and also in Buiter and Miller
(1982). The case  0 5 < b  (abnormal reaction of the trade balance) leads to a positive determinant of the dy-
namic aggregate system and to the loss of the saddle path property of the system. Moreover, we continue to
assume that domestic production responds immediately and perfectly elastic to changes in aggregate demand.
Assuming instead a Lundberg lag in domestic production where supply responds sluggishly to changes in ag-
gregate demand, output remains predetermined on impact and increases only gradually over time in response
to an anticipated increase in imported raw materials.13
librium value  0 q  (Figure 3), except for very small values of T. In T, the implementation of
the oil price increase leads – notwithstanding the fall in real interest rates - to a discontinuous
fall in output, which can be explained using (7) and (8) by the fall in real income y  in T and
the implied fall in aggregate demand.
24 The size of the contraction in T does not depend on the
time span between the anticipation and the implementation of the oil price increase.
25 For
“small” values of T, union output experiences a convergence from above to the new steady
state value of q, which is lower than the initial equilibrium value.
26 In contrast, for sufficiently
„large“ values of T, q converges to the new steady state value  1 q  from below.
Output effects in the individual member countries
As a consequence of the assumed asymmetries on the supply and the demand side, the cy-
clical developments in response to the symmetric oil price shock  0 d
* > R p  differ in the indi-
vidual member countries. Differential output developments within the monetary union are
captured by the output differential  2 1 q q q
d − = . The solution path of 
d q  in response to an
anticipated oil price increase typically looks as in Figure 4. Anticipating in t=0 the price in-
crease in T > 0, both countries experience a discontinuous and (due to our assumption
2 1 α α = ) identical increase in real interest rates. This leads in U1 to a relatively stronger fall
in aggregate demand than in U2 because of the assumed asymmetry in the interest sensitivity
of private absorption ( 22 21 a a > ). The immediate real depreciation of the common currency
improves the trade balance and increases aggregate demand symmetrically. In consequence,
on impact and in the early period of adjustment output in U2 is higher than in U1, In other
words, the output differential is on impact negative:  0 ) 0 ( < +
d q . This initial cyclical differ-
ential favoring U2 relative to U1 changes quantitatively and even qualitatively over time in
response to changes in the internal and external terms of trade. The internal terms of trade
2 1 p p p
d − =  start to fall over time in response to differential inflation developments within
                                                
24 For  y = y1+y2, the link with domestic production is given by  . 2 ) ( 2 0
* * c p p q y R − − + + = ψ ψτ  Contrary to q,
y falls due to  0 ) 0 ( τ τ < +  already on impact ( 0 ) 0 ( y y < + ) and also in the subsequent adjustment process. As
*
R p  jumps in T,  y experiences another discontinuous contraction in T.
25  This result holds generally and follows from the fact that the jump variable τ  remains continuous in T. In
contrast, the size of the initial jump depends on T. See Turnovsky (2000), pp. 187 ff.
26  This statement also holds in the special case T = 0. The initial jump in q is ambiguous in sign because the
shock  0 d
* > R p  has a negative impact on y and therefore also on private absorption while on the other hand
the terms of trade worsen and real interest rate falls. A realistic empirical parameterization suggests
0 ) 0 ( q q < + .14
the monetary union.
27 This improves the internal competitiveness of U1 compared with U2 and
its bilateral trade balance within the union from the perspective of U1. Furthermore, U1 expe-
riences a decline in the respective external (final goods) terms of trade  1 τ  on impact and also
in the subsequent adjustment process, which goes beyond the corresponding decline of  2 τ  for
U2 such that the improvement of the trade balance of U1 with respect to the large foreign
country exceeds the one of U2.
28 Viewed in isolation, the developments of the internal and
external terms of trade following the impact effect result in a larger expansionary effect on  1 q
than on  2 q . It follows that the output differential  2 1 q q q
d − =  increases after the negative
impact effect. Apart from that, the rise in real interest rates exerts a negative impact on both
member countries. This effect is assumed to be stronger in U1 than in U2 and causes therefore
a decrease in the output differential 
d q . As long as the difference between the interest sensi-
tivities of private absorption is sufficiently small, the terms of trade effects dominate the real
interest rate effect on 
d q such that on balance the output differential increases after the nega-
tive impact effect. The increase in 
d q  is rooted in the fall in the producer price differential
d p , whose development is driven by inflation differentials. The rate of producer price infla-
tion in U1 is relatively lower ( 2 1 p p & & < ) due to different wage dynamics in the anticipation
period  T t < < 0 . This follows from two factors: First, the rate of consumer price inflation 
c p &
exceeds on impact for  T t < < 0  the constant rate of monetary growth m &  and increases even
thereafter.
29 Second, the output gap in U1 (i.e., the difference  1 1 q q − ) and the corresponding
rate of wage inflation are higher than the corresponding values in U2.
The country-specific developments in the internal and external terms of trade lead in the
course of the adjustment process to a reversal in the relative cyclical impact of the price shock
across the monetary union. In other words, they lead to a sign change in the solution time path
of the output differential, which occurs at the latest at the date of implementation T. More
formally, we find a date of a cyclical reversal  t
U with 0 < t
U ≤ T such that q
d < 0 (or q1 < q2)
                                                
27  The initial period of adjustment is characterized by  1 2 π π >  and  1 2 q q >  and following (11) and (12)
) 0 ( ) 0 ( 1 2 + > + w w & & . The dynamic price adjustment equations  (9) and (10) then imply  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 1 2 + > + p p & & .
28  In the period 0 < t < T, the relationship  ) ( 5 , 0 1
d p + = τ τ  and the fall in τ  and 
d p  imply that  1 τ  also falls.
For  ) ( 5 , 0 2
d p − = τ τ  we find  1 2 τ τ >  where after the initial discontinuous fall in t = 0+ it can not be ruled
out theoretically that  2 τ subsequently increases.
29 Not  only 
c p &  but also  2 1 p p p & & & + =  increases continuously in the interval  T t < < 0 . The effect on  p &  is
smaller (underproportional) than on 
c p & due to  0 3 < = − τ α & & &
c p p . In contrast, q generally falls after the (typi-15
holds for t < t
U  and q
d > 0 (or q1 > q2) holds for (at least sufficiently small) t > t
U. The reversal
date t
U occurs before the date of implementation T, as long as the period between the antici-
pation and the implementation of the oil price shock is sufficiently long. In the case that the
period is very short, t
U coincides with T.
30 The special case T = 0 with an unanticipated price
shock always leads q
d > 0.
At the date of implementation T, the output differential q
d increases discontinuously
because the real interest rate rises and lowers by assumption private absorption in U1 more
strongly than in U2. The rise in the output differential in T is associated with a discontinuous
increase in the inflation differential  2 1 p p p
d & & & − = , which was negative up to T.  The subse-
quent development of q
d depends on the time span between the anticipation and the imple-
mentation of the price increase. For “small” values of T, q
d increases somewhat even beyond
T because the rate of inflation in U2 remains in this case initially above U1 ( 1 2 p p & & > ). The
inflation differential 
d p & continues to be negative and the price differential  2 1 p p p
d − =  falls
correspondingly. In the long run, the price differential 
d p  returns to its initial level  0 =
d p
such that 
d p  needs to increase for sufficiently large t > T, which requires a positive inflation
differential ( 0 2 1 > − = p p p
d & & & ). Simultaneously, the external terms of trade 1 τ  of U1 improve
and U1 experiences a decline in international competitiveness. The output differential q
d needs
to fall for sufficiently large t > T in order to return toward the end of the adjustment process to
the initial value  0 =
d q .
For sufficiently “large” T, q
d starts to fall immediately after the initial increase in T
because producer inflation in U1 is higher than in U2 ( 2 1 p p & & > ) and the price differential 
d p
increases correspondingly for t > T. In contrast with the case of a “small” T , the system may
experience another date of reversal t
* > T where the output differential again changes sign (it
turns negative). Given T “large”, the price differential may increase for sufficiently large t
beyond the steady state level 0 =
d p  due to strong asymmetries in nominal wage develop-
                                                                                                                                                        
cally) positive impact effect such that as the result of the anticipation of a future price increase in imported
raw materials the monetary union experiences stagflation.
30  The solution path of q
d has a reversal date t
N in the interval 0 < t < T, which is independent from T. For suffi-
ciently “large” T, we find t
N < T and therefore t
U(=t
N) < T. If, in contrast, T is sufficiently “small”, T < t
N
holds such that a reversal date t
U does not exist in the interval 0 < t < T. We then find q
d < 0 for all t < T but
q
d > 0 for t > T (provided t is not too large), as q
d increases discontinuously in T, and because the jump in T is
independent from T and always larger than  ) (t q
d  for any t < T. The real income differential y
d = y1-y2 also
experiences for T > 0 a reversal at  T t
K ≤ . Due to 
d d d p q y ψ + =  and p








ments across the monetary union. The member country U1 experiences a loss in international
competitiveness. At the reversal date t
*, the output differential q
d turns again negative and
converges therefore for t > t
* toward  0 =
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Figure 4: Development of the output differential
Output developments in the individual member countries are given in Figure 5.
32 They
represent linear combinations of the solution paths for aggregate and differential output. We
showed for empirically realistic parameterizations that aggregate output q = q1 + q2 experi-
ences a discontinuous increase on impact and a monotonic decline in 0 < t < T. The output
variable q2 therefore increases on impact and subsequently falls. In contrast with q2, q1 does
not necessarily increase in the early phase of the adjustment process because the difference
variable  2 1 q q q
d − =  falls. Furthermore, q1 does not necessarily experience a contraction in
the interval 0 < t < T due to the fall of the price differential 
d p  and of τ . In Figure 5, we
present the most realistic case that q1 falls on impact as well as in the subsequent adjustment
process. However, the size of the subsequent contraction in U1 is smaller than in U2 such that
after the date of reversal t
U, q1 stays above q2. At the date of implementation T, both countries
experience a discontinuous contraction, which turns out to be larger for U2 than for U1. In the
case  t
U = T, i.e., for T being „small“, both countries experience a monotonic convergence of
their output levels from above to their respective new steady state levels, which are below the
initial value. Output q1 remains hereby consistently above q2. In contrast, with t
U < T, i.e., T is
                                                
31  The second date of reversal t
* only exists for sufficiently large values of  T. For “intermediate” values of T, q
d
converges monotonically for t > T from above toward the steady state value  0 =
d q .
32  The qualitative developments of real output and real income  y1 and y2 are identical.17
sufficiently „large“, q1 and q2 experience divergent developments in the adjustment process
following the discontinuous contraction in T. While q1 continues to fall, q2 experiences an
expansionary process because the price differential  2 1 p p p
d − =  increases for t > T while
the terms of trade  ) ( 5 , 0 2
d p − = τ τ  simultaneously fall such that the international competi-
tiveness of U2 improves. For sufficiently large t, i.e., after the second date of reversal t
*, q2
stays above q1. In the long run, output levels in both member countries converge to the same
equilibrium level.
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Figure 5: Output developments in individual member countries
4.  Reaction of Monetary Policy to Oil Price Increases
This section investigates the ability of monetary policy to facilitate in an asymmetric
monetary union the absorption of anticipated and unanticipated oil price shocks. Related to
EMU, the primary concern of the ECB is the achievement of price stability, which we inter-
pret in our model as to minimize consumer price inflation. Furthermore, according to the
Treaty of Maastricht and to the stability pact the ECB is expected to support the general eco-
nomic policy of the member countries. Monetary policy actions are here considered condu-
cive to this goal when they dampen business cycles at the aggregate level and also cyclical
divergences within the monetary union caused by exogenous shocks.
The analytical solutions to the aggregate and difference system determine the conditions
to be met and the policies needed for stabilization.
33 More formally, business cycles at the
aggregate level of euroland as well as asymmetric developments within EMU can be avoided
if the constants A1, A2 and  2
~
A  in the solution for the state vector () ′ − ) ( , p m τ  are all set
                                                
33  See the appendix and for a more detailed exposition Wohltmann and Clausen (2002).18
equal to zero. Setting A1 = A2 = 0 removes any anticipation effects, i.e., the overall system
remains up to the date of implementation T in the initial steady state. Setting in addition  2
~
A =
0, anticipated oil price increases do not lead to further adjustment dynamics of the aggregate
and difference variables, i.e., the system jumps in T immediately into the new steady state.
In the special case T = 0, i.e., an unanticipated increase in oil prices, complete stabiliza-
tion of the aggregate and the difference system is achieved as long as monetary policy sets
0 ) ( d
~
2 = − − = p m A . Taking the rate of growth of the aggregate money stock m &  as the
monetary instrument, the common central bank has to change m &  such that the steady state
value of the real money stock remains unchanged.
34 An increase in oil prices leads in isolation
to a permanent fall of the real money stock.
35 An increase in m &  by one unit leads ultimately
to a fall in the real money stock where the size is determined by the semi-interest elasticity of
money demand (l2). The total differential
(20) 0 d
) (
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This contractionary monetary policy implies that both member countries achieve immedi-
ately without any further dynamic adjustments the new (lower) steady state level of the out-
puts q1 and q2 and cyclical divergences within the monetary union are prevented because the
common real interest rate remains with this policy tied to its initial level.
36 The reduction in
                                                
34  In contrast to changes in the growth rate of the money stock m & , one-time changes in the level of the money
stock m do not have any lasting effects on the real money stock. We therefore consider only changes in the
growth rate in the discussion of monetary stabilization.
35  This case prevails as long as b5 is sufficiently large.
36 Setting  0
~
2 = A  implies the following behavior of the aggregate q = q1 + q2 and the difference variable q
d = q1
– q2:  ) ( 0 1 q q q < ≡ ,  0 = ≡
d d q q  for all t > 0. Furthermore,  0 ≡ τ &  such that following (18) real interest rates
also remain constant. This implicitly assumes that the foreign interest rate i
* remains unaffected by the price
increase. An increase in the foreign interest rate i
* in response to the materials price increase leads in isolation
to a permanent rise in the level of nominal and real interest rates in the union. This causes a permanent output19
the rate of monetary growth in response to the exogenous oil price shock does not only pre-
vent temporary inflationary processes in the member countries but also a permanent reduction
in the rates of inflation 
c p1 &  and 
c p2 & . The restrictive monetary policy (21) is therefore also
consistent with the primary goal of ECB monetary policy of achieving price stability based on
the consumer price index.
The stabilizing impact of the contractionary monetary policy (21) with respect to the
aggregate system is illustrated in Figure 6. An unanticipated oil price increase viewed in iso-
lation leads to the adjustment process Q0B
*Q1 while the stabilizing monetary policy (21) cre-
ates the opposite development of the state variables τ  and m-p (adjustment path ' ˆ
1 0 Q B Q ).
With the simultaneous and unanticipated occurrence of both shocks ( 0 d
* < R p ,  0 d < m & ), the
aggregate system moves instantaneously into the new steady state Q2. Q2 is vertically below
the initial equilibrium Q0. In comparison, Q2 is characterized by a fall in the terms of trade τ
at an unchanged equilibrium real money stock m-p.
Figure 6 also illustrates the combined effects of the monetary policy reaction to antici-
pated oil price increases (T >0). In contrast with the case T = 0 monetary policy has to react
twice in order to achieve stabilization of the complete system throughout the entire adjustment
process. This is due to the fact that with anticipated shocks adjustment dynamics in the aggre-
gate and difference system not only occur for t>T but also prior to the implementation at T.
Full system stabilization in the period 0 < t < T requires the credible announcement of a
monetary policy, which exactly neutralizes the anticipation effects of the future price shock.
37
The anticipation of the future increase in 
*
R p  leads in the phase diagram (Figure 6) to the time
path Q0BC (for T “large“) or  C B Q ′ ′ 0  (for T “small”); the central bank designs its monetary
policy such that the corresponding adjustment runs exactly opposite to Q0BC (or  C B Q ′ ′ 0 ),
which is  C B Q
~ ~
0  (or  C B Q ′ ′ ′ ′ 0 ). This requires at the date of anticipation t = 0 the credible an-
nouncement or the expectation by the private sector of a restrictive monetary policy at T  of
the following form:
38
                                                                                                                                                        
differential between the member country with the lower interest sensitivity of private absorption ( 0 d <
d q
or, respectively,  ) d d 2 1 q q <  (see Wohltmann and Clausen 2001).
37  More formally, in the solution of the state vector () ′ − ) ( , p m τ , the constant A2 (=  -A1) is set equal to zero.
38  (22) is more contractionary than (21) because the element h12 of the corresponding eigenvector is negative





























As long as this reaction of monetary policy in T is considered credible and therefore antici-
pated by the private sector, the aggregate as well as the difference system remain up to T in
the initial steady state Q0. The output variables q = q1 + q2 and q
d = q1 – q2 satisfy in the pe-
riod  T t < ≤ 0 :  0 q q =  and  0 =
d q . Moreover, inflation remains constant in this period
( 0 m p p
c & & & = = ) such that the anticipation of the monetary policy reaction (22) avoids stagfla-
tionary developments within the monetary union, which are otherwise caused by the anticipa-
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Figure 6: Monetary policy reactions to oil price increases
If the central bank fully implements the announced reduction in monetary growth and
given that the oil price increases in T, the system moves in the period  t > T continuously ac-
cording to the state vector () ′ − ) ( , p m τ  along the initial saddle path S0 belonging to Q0 to
the new equilibrium in  0 Q′ . In comparison with the new steady state Q1 in the case of a pas-21
sive monetary policy ( 0 d = m & ), we find here a permanent increase in the real money stock.
39
In contrast with the case  0 d = m & , the real interest rate now increases in T
40 such that aggre-
gate output q = q1 + q2 falls on impact below the new steady state level  ) ( 0 1 q q <  and con-
verges subsequently to  1 q  from below. The output differential q
d = q1 – q2 immediately falls
in T due to the interest rate increase and the relatively stronger response of private absorption
in U1.
41 In contrast with the case of a passive monetary policy where the negative output dif-
ferential already occurs at the date of anticipation t = 0, it is shifted here to the date imple-
mentation T. A complete stabilization in the period t > T, i.e., the removal of any adjustment
dynamics, will only be achieved if monetary policy does not fully reduce the growth rate of
the money stock as previously announced but conducts instead in T a less restrictive monetary
policy. The required reduction in m &  is determined by the condition that both impulses taken
together – the price shock and the policy response - do not change the equilibrium real money
stock. Drawing on (20) and (21), the size of the reduction in m &  equals the case T = 0.
The phase diagram (Figure 6) shows that the deviation from the previously announced
and therefore anticipated contractionary monetary policy implies that the state vector
() ′ − ) ( , p m τ  jumps in T in response to both, the oil price increase and the correction of ex-
pectations by the private sector, vertically onto the saddle path S1 into point B
*. The unantici-
pated changeover to a less restrictive monetary policy in T causes another vertical jump but
now in opposite direction into Q2. The aggregate variables remain constant afterwards and no
further adjustment dynamics take place such that the point Q2 – like in the special case T = 0 –
represents the new final equilibrium of the system.
42 This two-stage monetary policy design
also stabilizes the difference system completely, i.e., avoids any cyclical differences in output
                                                
39  Taken individually, the restrictive monetary policy announced in t = 0 and implemented in T > 0 generates
the adjustment path  1 0
~ ~ ~
Q C B Q  (for T large) or  1 0
~
' ' ' ' Q C B Q  (for T small). The necessary fall in the rate of
growth of the money stock is larger than the policy response to an unanticipated shock (T=0). Correspond-
ingly, the steady state-increase in the equilibrium money stock turns out to be higher ( 1
~
Q  in comparison with
1 Q′ ).
40  The movement of the aggregate system from Q0 to  0 Q′  along the saddle path S0 implies a continuous decline
in the terms of trade τ  ( 0 < τ & ). Eq. (18) then implies that the real interest rate then exceeds its steady state
level 
* 2i .
41  A passive monetary policy ( 0 d = m & ) would lead in T to a fall in interest rates and therefore to a discontinu-
ous increase in q
d.
42  Taken in isolation, the increase in the price of imported raw materials generates an adjustment path from B
*
to Q1 along the saddle path S1. In contrast, the contractionary monetary policy (21) causes after the initial
jump B
*Q2 the mirror image adjustment process Q2E along the somewhat higher located saddle path S2. With
both shocks occurring simultaneously, the aggregate system jumps immediately into the new steady state Q2
and remains there thereafter.22
or price developments within the monetary union. Moreover, the rate of inflation within the
monetary union is permanently reduced.
The announcement or anticipation of the contractionary monetary policy (22) and the actual
implementation of a less restrictive monetary policy means that in quantitative terms the be-
havior of monetary policy is time-inconsistent. In contrast, monetary policy remains time-
consistent in qualitative terms because the previously announced and the actual course of
monetary policy still move in the same direction. The quantitative deviation of the actual pol-
icy from the announced reaction function (22) does not seriously undermine the reputation of
monetary policy (this holds the more as price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy
is still achieved). Finally, the changeover from the previously announced or expected mone-
tary policy reaction (22) to the actual course followed (21) achieves complete stabilization.
Business cycles at the aggregate level as well as cyclical differences within the monetary un-
ion resulting from anticipated increases in oil prices can be completely avoided.
The derivation of the policy decision rules (21) and (22) assumed that the increase in the
oil price leads to price changes within the monetary union but leaves the foreign price level
∗ p  unchanged. This assumption is unrealistic as, for example, the oil price hikes initiated by
the OPEC countries caused increased inflation worldwide. Viewed in isolation, an anticipated
and an unanticipated increase in the price of imported final goods ( 0 d >
∗ p ) incur adjustment
dynamics at the aggregate level of the monetary union, which run opposite to previous effects
of an oil price increase.
43 The steady state effects on real variables and relative prices in the
system are quantitatively identical but opposite in sign provided that 
∗ ∗ = R dp dp .
44 In contrast
to the case of oil imports, a price increase in imported final goods leads to jumps in the exter-
nal terms of trade τ  not only at the anticipation date but also at the date of implementation T.
This stems from the fact that an increase in p
* leads per se due to  ) ( 2
* e p p + − = τ  to a dis-
continuous fall in τ .
                                                
43  In contrast with the previous case  0 d >
∗
R p , the constants A1, A2 and 2
~
A  now change their sign in the solution
form of the state vector. The absolute values of the constants are not equal to those in the case  0 d >
∗
R p . It
follows that the adjustment dynamics in response to  0 d >
∗ p  are not an exact mirror image to the effects
caused by an identical increase in the price of imported raw materials.


















τ τ  and
0 / ) ( / ) (
* * > ∂ − −∂ = ∂ − ∂ R p p m p p m . Analogous results can be derived for the case of immediate price ad-
justment for the state variables  w τ  and m-w.23
Monetary stabilization in the simultaneous presence of price increases in intermediate
and final goods requires the following: given the realistic assumptions that the oil price in-
crease leads to an underproportional increase in the foreign price level ( 1 d / d
* * < R p p  or, re-
spectively, 
* * d d 0 R p p < < ) and lagged adjustment in the domestic price level, unanticipated
combined foreign price shocks can be perfectly neutralized at the aggregate and the difference
level by an adequate reduction in the rate of growth of the money stock. The policy reaction
(21) is modified by replacing the isolated price shock  0 d
* > R p  by the (quantitatively smaller)
combined shock  ) 0 ( d d
* * > − p pR .
45 The required fall in the rate of growth of the money stock
in response an unanticipated combined foreign price shock is smaller than with an isolated
increase in oil prices.
46 With anticipated combined foreign price shocks (T > 0) the system can
be stabilized in the period between the anticipation and the implementation of the foreign
price increases by the credible announcement in t = 0 of a policy implemented in T > 0:
47
(23) ) d d (
) ( 1

































This policy rule for monetary growth implies a contractionary stance ( 0 d
. <
ann m & ) when
the oil price increase has a relatively small impact on the foreign price level p
*, i.e., as long as
* * d / d R p p  is sufficiently small. In this case, both terms in (23) are negative
48 and the monetary
policy rule is time-consistent in qualitative terms. If monetary policy pursues in T in order to
stabilize the system after T a less contractionary stance than previously announced
49, the di-
                                                

















































* * p pR >
46  This is due to the fact that the adjustment dynamics following a foreign price increase in final goods  0 d
* > p
mirror those arising from 0 d
* > R p , and, furthermore, due to our assumption
* * d d p pR > .
47  (23) simplifies with  0 d















































48  The first expression in brackets in (23) is only negative, if 
* dp  is sufficiently small or, respectively,
* * d d p pR −  is sufficiently large.
49  The monetary policy actually conducted in T is identical to the case T = 0 and equals the second term in (23).24
rection of monetary policy remains unchanged. In contrast, if
* dp  is large relative to
* d R p  or
the difference 
* * d d p pR − sufficiently small, we find  0 d
. >
ann m & . The stabilization of the com-
plete system requires the announcement of an expansionary but the later conduct of a con-
tractionary monetary policy. Policy is time-inconsistent in both, in quantitative and qualitative
terms. This undermines the credibility of monetary policy and causes the central bank to lose
reputation.
5.  Summary
This paper investigates the dynamic effects of anticipated oil price increases in an asym-
metric two-country model of a small monetary union. The union is characterized on the sup-
ply side by different wage setting behavior of trade unions and on the demand side by differ-
ent interest sensitivities of private absorption. Wage setting behavior in U1 is supposed to con-
sider the growth of money supply in the union, whereas wage growth in U2 is linked to the
short-run variation of the consumer price index. Private consumption in member country U1 is
supposed to respond more strongly to the interest rate than in country U2. It is shown that a
stagflationary process for the whole union starts even before the oil price increase takes place.
Furthermore, due to macroeconomic asymmetries cyclical divergences occur within the
monetary union throughout the entire adjustment process. The direction of the cyclical diver-
gence depends on the short-run reaction of the real interest rate. On impact, real interest rates
increase and from the perspective of U1 we find a negative cyclical differential within the
monetary union.
50 In the subsequent adjustment process, the changes in the internal and exter-
nal terms of trade of U1 strengthen its international competitiveness and its relative cyclical
position within the monetary union. At some stage during the adjustment process, even a
complete reversal of the cyclical differential takes place. It happens at the latest when the
price increase is implemented.
In the special case of an unanticipated price increase, the monetary union does not experi-
ence a cyclical reversal between the member countries. In the case of sluggish price adjust-
ment, the output level q1 in U1 remains due to a relatively larger interest sensitivity of aggre-
                                                
50  It can be shown that on impact the direction of the real interest rate change and, consequently, the direction
of the cyclical divergence within the monetary union crucially depends on the asymmetry on the supply side.
Given a symmetric setup in which wage setting in both countries is linked to consumer price inflation we find
that the anticipation of a future price increase in imported raw materials leads on impact to a fall in the real
interest rate and therefore in view of U1 a positive output differential.25
gate demand and to the fall in the level of real interest rates consistently above the output
level q2 in U2.
51
It is shown that the adjustment dynamics following of oil price increase (in particular,
the stagflationary consequences) as well as cyclical divergences within the monetary union
can be avoided by a countercyclical monetary policy. In the case of an unanticipated increase
in the oil price, sluggish price adjustment and the condition that the price level of imported
final goods increases less than proportionately it is necessary to reduce the rate of monetary
growth in the union. This policy response ensures that the output variable and the external
terms of trade immediately attain their new (lower) long-run equilibrium values and a perma-
nently lower rate of inflation in the union.
In the case of an anticipated increase in the oil price, complete stabilization in both pe-
riods, i.e., the period between the anticipation and the implementation as well as the period
after the implementation, requires a qualitatively time-consistent monetary policy, which on
impact credibly announces for the date of implementation of the price increase a contraction-
ary monetary policy taking the form of a reduction in the rate of monetary growth but reduces
at the actual implementation date the monetary growth by a relatively smaller amount than the
initial announcement. The direction of the actual policy is consistent with the announced
change such that the credibility of monetary policy remains intact. However, monetary policy
encounters a time-inconsistency problem in the presence of anticipated oil price increases if it
is accompanied by a sufficiently large increase in the price of imported final goods.
                                                
51 In the case of full price flexibility, real interest rates increase and q1 remains below q2 throughout the entire
adjustment process. See for more details Wohltmann and Clausen (2002).26
6. Appendix
Aggregate and difference system
Using the decomposition method by Aoki (1981) the model (1)-(16) is transformed into the
following set of equations using either aggregate or difference variables:
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The equations (A1)-(A6) describe the aggregate system while the equations (A7)-(A10) repre-
sent the difference system.
Model reduction
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The LM equation (A3) can be reformulated as
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The determinant  21 12 22 11 1 d d d d − = ∆  of (A15) reduces to  ∆ − = ∆ /
~
5 1 b µ . In the case  0
~
5 > b
and  0 > ∆ , we obtain a negative determinant  1 ∆  and the system (A15) displays the saddle
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Assuming  0 1 < ∆  implies one unstable and one stable root, which we define as  2 1 0 r r > > .







































We assume that  0 11 > h  and  0 12 < h .
An increase in the price of imported raw materials/intermediate goods ( 0 d
* > R p ) or in im-
ported final goods ( 0 d
* > p ), which is announced in t = 0 and implemented in T > 0, results in
the following state vector  ) , ( ′ − p m τ , which describes the unique convergent time path
from the initial equilibrium  ) ) ( , ( 0 0 p m− τ  to the new long-run equilibrium
) ) ( , ( 1 1 p m− τ :
52
                                                
52 See Wohltmann and Clausen (2001). The expression 
t rj e  in (A18) and (A19) represents  ). 2 , 1 ( ) ( exp = j t rj29
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The constants A1, A2 and  2
~
A  are determined by three conditions: assuming price rigidity, the
variable  p m−  is predetermined and therefore required to remain continuous at t = 0 and t =
T while the jump variable τ  satisfies at the date of implementation T the condition
* d 2 ) ( ) ( p T T − = − − + τ τ .
53 In the special case T = 0, i.e., with unanticipated foreign price
shocks, the solution time path is only given by (A19) where  ) ( d
~
2 p m A − − = . The steady state
solution to the system (A15) is determined by  p m & & & − = = 0 τ . The steady state responses
0 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( d p m p m p m − − − = −  and  0 1 d τ τ τ − =  to foreign price increases
(0 d
* > R p ,0 d
* > p ) can be derived from the total differential of the IS equation, the long-run
supply function and the LM equation:
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An isolated price increase in imported raw materials ( 0 d
* > R p ,0 d
* = p ) leads in the steady
state to  0 d < τ  and  0 ) ( d < − p m . In this case we find A2 > 0 while  2
~
A  turns out to be posi-
                                                
53  The nominal exchange rate e is a component of τ  and responds discontinuously only at the time of an-
nouncement t = 0. In the case  0 d
* = p , τ  remains continuous in T.30
tive (negative) for sufficiently small (large) values of T. In contrast, an isolated price increase
in imported final goods ( 0 d
* = R p ,0 d
* > p ) ultimately leads to  0 d > τ  and  0 ) ( d > − p m .
Correspondingly, A2 < 0 and  0
~
2 < A  (0
~
2 > A ) for T sufficiently small (large).
Using (A19), the unique convergent saddle path for the aggregate system S follows as:
(A22) ( ) ) ( ) ( 12 p m p m h − − − = −τ τ
Due to h12 < 0 the saddle path has a negative slope in the phase diagram.
The difference system (A7)-(A10) can be reduced to the following dynamic equation gov-
erning the predetermined variable  2 1 p p p
d − = :
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+ + γ µ for t > T31
where  . d 0 1
d d d p p p + =  This solution path is continuous everywhere.
54 In the case  0 d
* > R p  or
0 d
* > p  we have  0 d =
d p  because foreign price changes affect both member countries sym-
metrically in the long run.
55 We assume the initial values of corresponding variables in both
member countries to be identical such that  0 0 0 = =
d d y p . As a result of asymmetric parame-
ters in interest rate transmission ( 0 ~
2 > a ) the difference of IS equations (A7) requires in con-
junction with  0 0 =
d y  the additional assumption  02 01 a a > .
Cyclical differences within the union are described by the output differential  2 1 q q q
d − = . It
follows from (A7) and  0 ) 0 ( < + τ &  (given T > 0) so that 
d q  falls on impact discontinuously:
56
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The subsequent decline in the price level differential  2 1 p p p
d − =  generates a continuous
increase in 
d q .
57 The decline of the internal price differential 
d p  can be inferred from (A23):
(A27) 0 ) 0 ( ) 0 )( (
2
1
) 0 ( 1 < + + + − = + τ µγ µ & & & & p m p
d
                                                
54 See  Wohltmann and Clausen (2001) for the case without imported raw materials ( 0 , 1 = = ψ µ ).
55  In contrast, an increase in the level of foreign interest rates ( 0 d
* > i ) leads due to  0 ~
2 > a  and following (A7)
and (A10) to  0 d <
d p  and  0 d <
d q .
56  In the special case T = 0 we find  0 ) 0 ( > +
d q  as a result of  0 ) 0 ( > + τ & .
57  In the case that the difference in the semi-interest elasticities  21 a  and  22 a  is very large, 
d q  may even decline
somewhat further after the initial discontinuous fall on impact. This case, however, is empirically very unre-
alistic and therefore considered irrelevant.32
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